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Abstract
We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of ﬁrms changes as an economy
approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated ﬁrms, owners (managers)
have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial
overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates
the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the
owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities
are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of
innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing. (JEL: L22, O31, O33, O38, O40, L16)
1. Introduction
A view dating back at least to Gerschenkron (1962) sees considerable differences in
the organization of ﬁrms and the economy in general between technologically
advanced societies and those that are technological followers. In economies that are
technologically relatively backward, there are more long-term relationships between
ﬁrms and banks, larger, perhaps more vertically integrated, ﬁrms, less competition,
greater state intervention, and generally more “rigid” institutions.
In Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002) (henceforth AAZ) we formalize
this notion, and build on it to analyze a range of issues related to technological
progress and economic growth. In this paper, we study the relationship between
vertical integration and technological convergence. Outsourcing avoids mana-
gerial overload and increases innovation-related activities (as in Aghion and
Tirole 1997). Vertical integration, on the other hand, avoids the holdup prob-
lems and the rent sharing associated with outsourcing (as in Grossman and Hart
1986). Building on the same ideas as in AAZ, we argue that innovation activities
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© 2003 by the European Economic Associationbecome more important as the economy approaches the world technology
frontier. Therefore, at some point it becomes worthwhile to incur the costs of
sharing the rents with suppliers, in order to beneﬁt from greater innovation by
outsourcing some of the production activities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the macroeconomic
part of the model and derives the dynamic equation for aggregate productivity.
Section 3.1 derives the equilibrium investments in scale and innovation under
vertical integration and nonintegration (outsourcing). Section 3.2 analyzes how
ﬁrm owners’ decisions whether or not to vertically integrate depends upon the
country’s distance to the technological frontier. Section 3.3 shows how persis-
tent integration may lead to nonconvergence traps.
2. Basic Setup
2.1 Agents and Production
The economy is populated by a continuum of non-overlapping generations of
one-period lived agents. Each generation consists of a mass 1 of “capitalists” who
hold initial property rights over “production sites,”and a mass 1 Lof workers that
can also be employed as managers. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor
that she supplies inelastically with no disutility. All individuals are risk neutral.
There is a unique ﬁnal good that serves as numeraire and is produced
competitively using labor and a continuum of intermediate inputs according to:
yt 
1

L
1
0
1
stvAt
1xt
d, (1)
where st(v)At() is the productivity in sector  at time t, xt()i st h eﬂow of
intermediate good  used in ﬁnal good production again at time t, and   [0,
1], st(v) will be the component of productivity coming from ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investments, and At() is the state of technology in this sector, determined by
imitation and innovation activities.
In each intermediate sector , one intermediate producer can produce 1 unit
of intermediate good with leading-edge productivity At(), using 1 unit of ﬁnal
good as capital. Firm-speciﬁc investments and productivity improvements are
decided at the beginning of the period. Ex post each intermediate good pro-
ducer faces a competitive fringe of imitators that forces her to charge a limit
price: pt()  . Demand for each intermediate is given from (1) as xt(v) 
(pt())
1/(1)st(v)At()L. Using the limit price, equilibrium monopoly proﬁts
are therefore obtained as:
t  stvAtL (2)
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(1/(1)) is a measure of the degree of competition in the
economy, and is monotonically increasing in . When , or equivalently , is high,
which in turn may be due to technological reasons or to government regulation,
there is less competitive pressure, and prices and monopoly proﬁts are higher.
Now deﬁne
At 
0
1
Atd (3)
as the average productivity in the country at date t, A 
t the productivity at the
world frontier (with all countries having a state of technology At  A 
t), and at 
At/A 
t as an (inverse) measure of the country’s distance to the technological
frontier.
2.2 Productivity Growth
Before production takes place at any date, intermediate ﬁrms can increase produc-
tivity, either by imitating frontier technologies or by innovating upon existing
technologies in the country. Imitation is automatic, but innovation requires invest-
ments and skills on the part of entrepreneurs/managers, and the success of innova-
tion will vary between ﬁrms and over time. More speciﬁcally, we assume:
At  A  t1 	 
tAt1, (4)
and that

t  
 	 xtv. (5)
In this equation, we can interpret xt(v) as the probability that an innovation in
sector v at time t is successful. If so, there is innovation in the amount 1  
.
Otherwise, there is a smaller innovation, of size 
. These innovations build on
the knowledge stock of the country, thus they multiply At1. The ﬁrst term in
(4), on the other hand, reﬂects imitation from the world technology frontier,
hence the term A 
t1.
In equilibrium, all intermediate ﬁrms in the same country will choose the
same innovative intensity xt()  x. Then, dividing both sides of the above
equation by A 
t1, and integrating over , we obtain a simple linear equation
describing how the state variable at  At/A 
t evolves over time, namely:
at 
1
1 	 g
 	 
 	 xat1, (6)
where g is the growth rate of world technology frontier.
1
Equation (6) is a simpler version of the productivity growth equation in
1. That the ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment, s, does not contribute to technological progress is inessential
for the results.
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organizational choices, affecting the  and x terms in (6). Relying on experience
increases  at the expense of x, whereas choosing the innovation-based strategy
increases x at the expense of . As the economy approaches the world technol-
ogy frontier, a, increases, and selection and innovation become more important.
This in turn tilts the balance towards organizational choices that favor selection
and innovation. In AAZ, the major decision was whether or not to terminate less
successful ﬁrms and managers. Here we will look at a complementary decision,
that of whether to vertically integrate certain production activities or to out-
source them (and in addition, the vertical integration decision here will only
affect x and not , but see footnote 5).
3. Distance to Frontier, Vertical Integration, and Convergence
3.1 A Simple Model of Vertical Integration Versus Outsourcing
We now analyze the vertical integration decision of (intermediate sector) ﬁrms.
These ﬁrms (or their owners/the capitalists) can either choose a “vertically
integrated” structure, in which they carry out both the production and innovation
activities. Alternatively, they can contract out either part of the production
activities or innovation activities. Here, because of page limits, we focus only on
the case of outsourcing production activities. The basic idea is that investment
in the scale of production and innovation both require effort, and perhaps more
important time and focus. In the vertically integrated structure, this creates
managerial overload. Outsourcing mitigates the managerial overload, but at the
same time, it creates a holdup problem:
2 a new agent is brought in, who will
share some of the rents with the owner, thereby reducing the owner’s income for
given effort, and via this channel, also his incentives to invest.
We model managerial overload by introducing a convex cost of effort; the
more effort the manager (or the owner) exerts, the higher is the marginal cost of
further effort. More formally, consider the following cost function for effort in
the case of vertically-integrated ﬁrm:
Cts, x 
kA  t1 if s 	 x  T
 otherwise
.
This cost function speciﬁes that there is a constant ﬁxed cost kA 
t1 (which
grows with the state the world technology to ensure balanced growth), and there
is 0 marginal cost of effort until s  x reaches T, and thereafter, the marginal
cost is inﬁnite. Hence, we have an L-shaped—thus extremely convex—marginal
2. Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and the incomplete contracts literature, we assume that
no ex ante contract can induce an enforceable division of surplus; sharing of proﬁts must rely
entirely upon ex post bargaining. In addition, here we do not consider the case where the owner
does not outsource, but hires the supplier as an employee.
633 Acemoglu et al. Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontiercost curve. The intuitive motivation for this function is that the manager (owner)
has a total available time of T which can be spent on production or innovation
activities.
We assume that
 	 
  T  
. (A1)
The ﬁrst part of the assumption ensures that the owner has “scarce” time, so that
the trade-offs emphasized here are more interesting. The second part is impor-
tant in making sure that there will be sufﬁcient innovation from devoting time
to innovation-type activities, for example by outsourcing.
The maximization problem of the owners of integrated ﬁrms is straightfor-
ward: choose (s, x) to maximize
Ut  stvAtL  Cts, x  Ls 	 
 	 xaA  t1  Cts, x,
where the second equality makes use of the fact that all ﬁrms will choose the
same x and s, and substitutes for At() using the deﬁnition for a and (4).
Assumption (A1), i.e., the scarcity of managerial time, then immediately
implies that the optimum x must be equal to zero.
3 In other words, in the
vertically integrated ﬁrm, effort overload discourages innovation. The optimal
scale of production is then simply: s  T. This, in turn, yields an equilibrium
level of utility for the owner equal to:
Ut
VI  u
VIaA  t1  LT 	 
a  kA  t1. (7)
Now consider the case where production activities are outsourced to an
independent supplier (we refer to this as the nonintegration case). The supplier’s
cost function is
C
ss 
kA  t1 if s  T
 otherwise
.
In other words, the supplier also has total time T, which he simply allocates to
productive activities, and incurs a ﬁxed cost kA 
t1, which is a fraction of the
ﬁxed cost of production incurred by the vertically integrated ﬁrm. Once these
production activities are outsourced, the cost function of the owner is:
Ct
xx 
kA  t1 if x  T
 otherwise
.
Therefore, the owner can now allocate all her time to innovation activities, and
incurs a ﬁxed cost of production kA 
t1. We assume that   1/2, so the owner
incurs a ﬁxed cost at least half as large the ﬁxed cost in the vertical-integrated
case (this assumption simpliﬁes some of the comparisons below, and is not
3. The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution yields: s  (  
a  Ta)/2a. A sufﬁcient
condition for s  T, and hence for x  0, is   
  T, which is ensured by assumption (A1).
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the case with outsourcing, the total labor force working in the intermediate
sector is equal to L.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and the incomplete contracts litera-
ture, we assume that scale and productivity decisions are ex post unveriﬁable by
third parties and therefore cannot be contracted upon ex ante. Thus the owner
and the supplier must rely on ex post bargaining to determine how proﬁts will
be shared between them. This creates a standard holdup problem: ex post some
of the rents have to be shared with the supplier. To simplify the discussion, we
assume that both the owner and the supplier have an outside option equal to zero
(i.e., once productive activities are outsourced, and investment decisions are
taken, the owner can no longer carry out productive activities if there is
disagreement). In addition, we assume that the surplus is large enough to cover
the ﬁxed cost for the supplier. Assuming equal bargaining power between the
owner and the supplier over the ex post surplus, each party obtains 1/2 of the ex
post surplus from the relationship, namely:
1⁄2Ls 	 
 	 xaA  t1.
Then, for given scale s, the ﬁrm will choose her innovation intensity x to
maximize its net return 1⁄2Ls( (
  x)a)A 
t1  Ct
x(x), and the supplier
chooses the scale of production, s, to maximize 1⁄2Ls(  (
  x)a)A 
t1 
Ct
s(s) taking the innovation intensity, x, as given. In equilibrium, we have:
s
NIa  T and x
NIa  T. (8)
Notice that in this case, despite the holdup problems, there is no underinvest-
ment because the marginal cost of investment is L-shaped. In a more general
model, underinvestment would occur and also discourage outsourcing. Given
(8), the equilibrium ex ante utility for the ﬁrm is equal to:
Ut
NI  u
NIaA  t1  1⁄2LT 	 
a 	 Ta  kA  t1. (9)
Assumption (A1) immediately implies that:
du
NI
da

du
VI
da
.
That is, the larger a, i.e., the closer the country is to the technological frontier,
the higher the value of innovating and therefore the higher the private beneﬁto f
outsourcing. Intuitively, outsourcing becomes privately more costly for the
owner as a increases, since greater a implies greater output, which is being
shared with the supplier. On the other hand, as a increases, innovation becomes
more important, and the value of outsourcing increases. Assumption (A1)
ensures that the second effects dominates the ﬁrst.
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We now determine the equilibrium integration decision as a function of the
country’s distance to the technological frontier (measured by a). The owners
(capitalists) decide whether to remain integrated or outsource production activ-
ities. Therefore, to determine the equilibrium organizational form we need to
compare u
VI(a) given by (7) to u
NI(a) given in (9).
4
First, suppose that a  0, then:
u
NI0 
LT
2
  k  u
VI0  LT  k (10)
(recall that   1/2). Thus in economies far away from the world technology
frontier, owners prefer to remain vertically integrated: innovation is relatively
unimportant compared to imitation in these economies, so outsourcing has little
beneﬁts, and high private costs because of the holdup problem. This result holds
despite the fact that from a technological point of view, outsourcing is superior
to vertical integration: there is no opportunity cost for the supplier (as he still
works in production), and there can be greater investments in innovation.
Nevertheless, from the owner’s point of view, outsourcing has private costs,
since the supplier shares some of the rents.
Setting u
VI(a
v)  u
NI(a
v) from (7) and (9), yields the critical threshold a
v 
(  (1  )k/L)/(T  
). For all a  a
v, equilibrium organizational form is
vertical integration, and for a 	 a
v, there will be outsourcing. The threshold a
v
is typically less than 1, so that there will be a switch to outsourcing before
reaching the technology frontier. Notice that a
v less than 1 is more likely when
the ﬁxed production cost k is high, competition is high (i.e.,  is small), or a 
is small. More generally, straightforward differentiation shows that a
v/ 	 0
and a
v/  0, thus vertical integration is more likely in less competitive
environments and in sectors where imitation is relatively more important. A less
competitive environment creates greater rents, increasing the private costs of
rent-sharing resulting from outsourcing. Also when imitation is more important,
the innovation beneﬁts of outsourcing are less pronounced relative to the rent
sharing costs.
3.3 Vertical Integration, Growth, and Nonconvergence Traps
So far we have discussed the effect of the state of technology, and the growth
process, on equilibrium organizational forms. Next we analyze the effects of
organizational forms, in particular of integration/outsourcing decisions, on the
4. Because production activities are outsourced to suppliers who have no wealth, contracts
requiring upfront payments from suppliers to owners are not possible. Contracts where potential
suppliers promise ex post payments are ruled out by our incomplete contracts assumption.
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v, where
equilibrium organizational form is vertical integration. Then, using equation (4),
we can characterize equilibrium productivity growth as:
at1 
 	 
at
1 	 g
. (11)
In contrast, in a country with at 	 a
v, owners will outsource production
activities, so innovations take place at the rate 
  x
NI(a)  
  T. As a result,
the law of motion of productivity relative to the frontier is:
at1 
1
1 	 g
 	 
 	 Tat). (12)
Comparing (11) and (12), we see that the economy with outsourcing always
grows faster.
5 This reﬂects the fact that from a technological point of view,
outsourcing is superior, and in equilibrium vertical integration emerges because
owners do not want to share the rents with suppliers.
Near the frontier, the maximum growth rate of the economy must be the
same as that of the frontier, thus we must also have
 	 
 	 T  1 	 g. (A2)
Given this condition, equation (12) implies that an economy with outsourcing
always converges towards the world technology frontier, i.e., (
  T)/(1  g) 
1. An economy with vertically integrated ﬁrms, on the other hand, not only
grows at a slower rate than an identical economy with outsourcing, but may also
stop converging towards the world technology frontier. To analyze this, ﬁrst
observe that (11) has a ﬁxed point at: atrap  /(1  g  
)  1. That /(1 
g  
)  1 immediately follows from (A2). When at  atrap, an economy with
vertical integration stops growing. Therefore, a vertically integrated economy
will be stuck in a nonconvergence trap at atrap. This does not, however, establish
that an equilibrium with a nonconvergence trap exists. It might indeed be the
case that an economy switches out of vertical integration before atrap. Therefore,
the condition for an equilibrium nonconvergence trap is that atrap  a
v.
When atrap  a
v, economies that start with a0  a
v will always stay with
vertically integrated ﬁrms, and never converge to the technology level of the
world frontier, whereas economies with a0 	 a
v grow faster and converge the
world technology frontier. Since a
v is increasing in , such traps are more likely
in less competitive economies (e.g., in economies where government policy
discourages entry). Conversely, in economies with atrap  a
v, government
5. It is straightforward to generalize this model, so that vertically integrated ﬁrms are more
successful in imitation, i.e., they have 
VI 	 
NI. In this case, somewhat more reminiscent to AAZ,
at the early stages of development, an economy with vertical integration will grow faster than an
economy with outsourcing, while closer to the frontier, outsourcing will produce faster growth.
637 Acemoglu et al. Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontierpolicy, for example by increasing competition, i.e., reducing , may prevent
nonconvergence traps.
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